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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
In 2011, Robert Cordaro was convicted of bribery, 
extortion, and racketeering, along with other crimes.  At his 
trial, the court instructed the jury that those crimes required an 
“official act.”  In 2016, however, the Supreme Court clarified 
what does — and does not — constitute an “official act” in 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).  Cordaro 
believes that the McDonnell decision makes his conduct 
noncriminal and so petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The District Court correctly concluded that 
Cordaro cannot show that he is actually innocent — that is, that 
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror properly 
charged under McDonnell would have convicted him.  We will 
affirm. 
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I. 
 
In November 2003, Cordaro and his co-defendant A.J. 
Munchak were elected as two of the three county 
commissioners for Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.  They 
began exploiting their positions for financial gain almost right 
after their terms began in January 2004, particularly with two 
local engineering firms, Acker Associates and Highland 
Associates. 
 
A. 
 
Acker Associates is a civil-engineering firm whose 
principals are Ken Acker and P.J. McLaine.  In 2003 and 2004, 
about 30 percent of Acker Associates’ business was municipal 
engineering, mostly for Lackawanna County.  McLaine 
testified that he actively supported Cordaro’s opponents in the 
2003 campaign.  When Cordaro and Munchak were elected, 
McLaine was concerned about keeping Acker Associates’ 
current county contracts.  McLaine brought those concerns to 
Al Hughes, a close friend of Cordaro, who agreed to talk to 
Cordaro to see if McLaine could meet with him and “do 
something about it.”  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 523 (McLaine).   
 
Hughes arranged for McLaine to meet with Cordaro in 
early 2004, telling McLaine to bring a list of the existing work 
that Acker Associates did for the county.  McLaine’s list 
included a contract to work on the Lackawanna Watershed 
2000 Program, a multi-year watershed project based on a $30 
million congressional grant.  McLaine testified that the grant 
was in the county commissioners’ names and that they had 
hired Acker Associates for the work.  When work started on 
the watershed project in 2003, Acker Associates brought on 
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seven new employees and bought a new truck and computer.  
McLaine’s list also included contracts to work on the Main 
Street Bridge in Taylor, Pennsylvania, and the Gilmartin Street 
Bridge in Archbald, Pennsylvania; work for the Lackawanna 
County Community Development and Redevelopment 
Authority, Housing Authority, River Basin Authority, and 
Valley Authority; and other work related to surveying, paving, 
and mapping. 
 
Cordaro and McLaine met in person.  McLaine testified 
that Cordaro told him, “I think I can let you keep that, . . . but 
you have to make sure you let us know everything that’s going 
on.  And if we’re having fundraisers you’re going to have to 
participate and support us.”  J.A. 526; see also J.A. 593 
(McLaine) (“So, if they have an affair, a fundraiser, that we 
have to participate.”).  McLaine agreed and “felt wonderful” 
after the meeting.  J.A. 526. 
 
In late spring or summer 2004, McLaine received a call 
from another engineering firm, CECO Associates, saying that 
it was taking over the design aspects of the Taylor Bridge 
contract.  McLaine called Hughes, who called Cordaro.  Again 
Hughes set up a meeting with McLaine and Cordaro, at which 
McLaine explained the phone call and argued that Acker 
Associates should keep the contract.  Cordaro “thought for a 
few minutes and said, ‘P.J., you can keep the contract.  . . .  Call 
CECO and tell them that you’re going to finish the project.’”  
J.A. 528–29 (McLaine).  McLaine “called CECO and told him 
[that Acker Associates was] going to finish the project.  They 
said okay.”  J.A. 529. 
In fall 2004, McLaine got a call from the lead 
consultants of the Lackawanna Watershed 2000 Program.  
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They asked to sit down with McLaine to discuss the project’s 
progress and schedule.  At this meeting, the consultants said 
that they were considering splitting up the project and giving 
parts out to other firms.   
 
Again McLaine called Hughes, who called Cordaro.  
Hughes testified that Cordaro asked him, “[d]o you think he’d 
want to help, you know, supporting — supporting us — 
supporting me to keep his work?”  J.A. 621.  Hughes 
responded, “how much money would you think would be 
legitimately, you know, to give for the work,” and Cordaro said 
“maybe $15,000.”  J.A. 621–22 (Hughes).1  
 
After this conversation with Cordaro, Hughes told 
McLaine that if he gave him $10,000 a month for Cordaro, 
Hughes could guarantee that Acker Associates would keep all 
of its existing work.  McLaine asked whether he would lose his 
work if he did not pay, and Hughes said that he probably 
would.  Hughes also asked whether McLaine knew the 
principals of Highland Associates — he did — and whether 
McLaine would convey the same arrangement to them.  
McLaine agreed to call Highland Associates, but said he would 
need to talk to his partner Ken Acker before Acker Associates 
agreed to the payments. 
 
                                              
1 Hughes’s testimony appears to conflate the conversation he 
had with Cordaro in mid-2004 (about CECO Associates and 
the Taylor Bridge project) and the one in late 2004 in which 
this exchange occurred, see J.A. 619–23, but his testimony and 
McLaine’s are consistent on the fact that the conversation 
about payments occurred in late 2004, see J.A. 529–31, 619–
23. 
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McLaine and Ken Acker discussed the matter.  Acker 
asked McLaine whether they could lose their contracts if they 
did not pay, and McLaine said that according to Hughes they 
could.  They decided that they did not want to take the chance, 
given the employees they had hired and the money they had 
invested because of their county contracts, especially the 
watershed project.  They decided to go along. 
 
Payments began in January 2005.  For the first payment, 
McLaine and Acker paid themselves bonuses by check, cashed 
the checks, and delivered the cash to Hughes.  They paid cash 
for four months and then began to pay with company and 
personal checks.  McLaine would meet Hughes in parking lots 
and diners to make the payments.  In the Acker Associates 
books, McLaine would label the expenses as consulting work.  
For every month from January 2005 to November 2007 (when 
Cordaro lost reelection), Acker Associates paid $10,000 to 
Hughes to forward to Cordaro, including one $15,000 payment 
because McLaine “had gotten another . . . contract[].”  J.A. 626 
(Hughes). 
 
B. 
 
Highland Associates is an architectural-engineering 
firm whose principals are Domenic Provini, Kevin Smith, and 
Don Kalina.   
 
In January 2004, as Al Hughes had requested, McLaine 
called Domenic Provini about making monthly payments to 
Cordaro.  They met, and McLaine told Provini the same thing 
that Hughes said to him:  “[i]f Highland would give Al 
[Hughes] $10,000 to Bob [Cordaro] they would be able to keep 
all their work also.”  J.A. 532 (McLaine).  Provini notified his 
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partners about this “cash contributions for work” arrangement.  
J.A. 714 (Kalina).  At that time, they decided they did not want 
to participate.  Highland Associates nevertheless received new 
county contracts that spring to work on a courthouse, a public 
safety center, an intermodal center (an epicenter for bus, cab, 
and railroad transportation), and a stadium in Lackawanna 
County.  
 
In April 2005, however, Munchak invited Don Kalina 
to lunch and said, “[w]ell, you know, you talked to P.J. 
McLaine and we need some cash.”  J.A. 715 (Kalina).  At that 
point, Highland Associates had nearly $1.4 million in 
outstanding accounts receivable with Lackawanna County, so 
Kalina and his partners felt compelled to comply.  They pooled 
$10,000 apiece, and Kalina paid it to Munchak.  Cordaro called 
Kalina and thanked him for the contribution that afternoon or 
the next morning. 
 
In June 2005, Munchak called Kalina again with the 
message that “we need some more cash.”  J.A. 722 (Kalina).  
The county still owed Highland Associates $1.3 million, so 
Kalina and his partners still felt that they had to pay.  Again 
they gave $30,000 to Munchak. 
 
In July or early August 2005, Cordaro met with James 
Finan, then the chairman of the board of directors of the County 
of Lackawanna Transit System (COLTS) and also the county’s 
director of transportation.  COLTS is a separate legal authority 
from the county, with a five-person board of directors.  Board 
members are appointed by the county commissioners.  Finan 
testified that Cordaro asked him to get ahold of “the architects 
on the center COLTS was building” — the intermodal center 
— “and ask[] them to step aside and go forward with just 
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Highland Associates.”  J.A. 791.  Finan did.  He contacted one 
of those architects and asked if they “would mind stepping 
aside from this project,” explaining that COLTS “wanted to go 
forward with just one architect and that being Highland.”  
J.A. 792 (Finan).  Finan followed that conversation up with a 
letter, dated August 5, 2005, which memorialized that COLTS 
was “terminating [its] contract . . . for any further services 
regarding the intermodal center” because it had “decided to go 
forward with the project with only one architectural and 
engineering firm, Highland Associates.”  J.A. 792.  The letter 
called this decision a “monetary and common sense issue.”  
J.A. 792.  Finan testified that he “was asked to contact them 
and ask[] them to step aside by Mr. Cordaro.”  J.A. 793.   
 
Cordaro was then “prominent in the negotiation” of 
COLTS’s contract with Highland Associates during August 
2005.  J.A. 794 (Finan).  In October 2005, the COLTS board 
approved that contract.  Two of the three voting board 
members, including Finan, had been appointed by 
Cordaro.    Although federal law required it to solicit at least 
three proposals and conduct a bidding process, the COLTS 
board considered only Highland Associates’ prospective 
contract.  
 
In November 2005, Munchak again came calling on 
Highland Associates for cash.  Again the partners agreed to 
pay.  Having just received the COLTS contract, they “were 
afraid that the contract would be stopped” if they did not pay 
since there are “many, many areas in standard . . . contracts that 
allow the owner to stop work.”  J.A. 732 (Kalina).  In late 
November or early December 2005, Cordaro was in the 
Highland Associates offices for a meeting, and Kalina gave 
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him an envelope with $30,000 cash.  Cordaro “put it in his 
jacket and he said, [t]hank you very much.”  J.A. 727 (Kalina).   
 
C. 
 
Cordaro was indicted in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in 2010.  The counts relevant here are bribery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); Hobbs Act extortion in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and racketeering in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). 
 
Cordaro’s trial took place in June 2011.  At the end, the 
court instructed the jury that 
 
• Bribery requires that Cordaro “acted 
corruptly with the intent to be influenced 
or rewarded in connection with official 
actions taken or intended to be taken by 
the defendant in his capacity as county 
commissioner of Lackawanna County.”  
J.A. 979. 
• Hobbs Act extortion requires that 
Cordaro took property knowingly and 
willfully by extortion “under color of 
official right,” which “means that the 
public official induced, obtained, 
accepted or agreed to accept a payment 
to which he or she was not entitled 
knowing that the payment was made in 
return for taking or withholding or 
influencing official acts.”  J.A. 985. 
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• “The term official act includes any act 
within the range of official duty of a 
public official and any decision, 
recommendation or action on any 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding 
or controversy which at any time may be 
pending or which may by law be brought 
before any public official in such public 
official’s capacity.  
Official acts include the decisions or 
actions generally expected of the public 
official.  . . . [I]n addition, official action 
includes the exercise of both formal and 
official influence and informal official 
influence.  Official action also includes 
a public official’s altering his or her 
official acts, changing the position 
which he or she would otherwise have 
taken or taking actions in his or her 
official capacity that he or she would not 
have taken but for the scheme.”  
J.A. 962.  Cordaro was convicted of bribery, extortion, 
racketeering, and other crimes.  He was sentenced to 132 
months of imprisonment, restitution, and three years of 
supervised release.  
 
D. 
 
Cordaro appealed his conviction and sentence.  This 
Court affirmed all but his restitution amounts.  United States v. 
Munchak, 527 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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In November 2013, Cordaro moved in the trial court to 
vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court held an evidentiary 
hearing and in August 2015 denied his motion, declining to 
issue a certificate of appealability.  Cordaro then sought a 
certificate of appealability from this Court, which we denied in 
April 2016. 
 
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
McDonnell v. United States, Cordaro applied to this Court for 
authorization to file a successive habeas motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  We denied that application, explaining that 
“Cordaro’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), is 
misplaced, as it did not announce a new rule of constitutional 
law, but rather clarified the meaning of what constitutes an 
‘official act’ under the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201.”  In re Cordaro, No. 16-4156 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) 
(order denying application).  We did, however, “note that we 
have not considered whether claims like Cordaro’s would be 
viable in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.”  Id. 
 
Cordaro then filed the habeas petition before us under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  After oral argument, but without an 
evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge determined that the 
§ 2241 petition was proper because “there is a chance that 
Cordaro is incarcerated for conduct that does not constitute a 
crime” and “he has had no earlier opportunity to test the 
legality of his detention,” but recommended that the District 
Court deny Cordaro’s petition on the merits because he failed 
to establish that he was actually innocent — that is, that it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted him if properly instructed under McDonnell.  
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J.A. 46, 52–60.  Over Cordaro’s objections, the District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and denied 
his petition. 
 
Cordaro timely appealed.  
  
II. 
 
 The Supreme Court has held that collateral relief from 
a federal criminal conviction is available under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 based on an intervening interpretation of a substantive 
criminal statute.  Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346–47 
(1974).  But an intervening statutory interpretation does not 
authorize a successive § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h).  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 247–48 (3d Cir. 
1997).  This creates a problem for a petitioner in the “unusual 
circumstance” when an intervening statutory interpretation that 
may render a petitioner’s conduct noncriminal comes only 
after his first § 2255 motion.  Id. at 251.  So, we have held that 
a petitioner in that “uncommon situation may resort to the writ 
of habeas corpus codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” id. at 248, 
because the remedy provided by § 2255 is “‘inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of [his] detention’” within the 
meaning of the saving clause of § 2255(e), id. at 249 (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).   
 
Two conditions must be satisfied to proceed under 
§ 2241.  “First, a prisoner must assert a ‘claim of “actual 
innocence” on the theory that “he is being detained for conduct 
that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an 
intervening Supreme Court decision” and our own precedent 
construing an intervening Supreme Court decision’” — that is, 
when there has been “a change in statutory caselaw that applies 
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retroactively in cases on collateral review.”  Bruce v. Warden 
Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013)).  
“And second, the prisoner must be ‘otherwise barred from 
challenging the legality of the conviction under § 2255.’”  Id. 
(quoting Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246).  “Stated differently, the 
prisoner has ‘had no earlier opportunity to challenge his 
conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive 
law may negate.’”  Id. (quoting Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252).  
Invoking the district court’s jurisdiction requires only that the 
record supports “at least a sufficiently colorable claim” that 
these conditions are met.  Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252. 
 
Here, the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction 
under § 2241.2  First, Cordaro asserted a colorable claim of 
actual innocence on the theory that he is being detained for 
conduct that was subsequently rendered noncriminal by the 
                                              
2 We follow Bruce in considering this inquiry to be 
jurisdictional, which no party has disputed, but note that our 
Court has not analyzed whether § 2255(e) is jurisdictional 
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), and its progeny.  Our sister Courts 
of Appeals that have applied Arbaugh and its progeny to 
§ 2255(e) have concluded that it is jurisdictional.  See United 
States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 422–26 (4th Cir. 2018); 
Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2013).  
Only the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
§ 2255(e) is not jurisdictional, in a decision that preceded 
Arbaugh.  See Harris v. Warden, 425 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 
2005).   
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Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell.3  Second, Cordaro 
had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction under 
McDonnell because we denied him a certificate of 
appealability on his first § 2255 motion in April 2016 and 
McDonnell was not decided until June 2016.   
 
Once satisfied it has jurisdiction over a habeas petition 
under § 2241, a district court provides the petitioner “with an 
opportunity to demonstrate his actual innocence.”  Tyler, 732 
F.3d at 253; see also id. at 246–47, 252–53.  The court can hold 
                                              
3 At oral argument, the Government conceded that McDonnell 
applies retroactively in cases on collateral review, as it has 
elsewhere, see, e.g., United States v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-CR-
272, 2018 WL 317974, at *9 n.6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2018) (“The 
government does not dispute . . . that McDonnell is 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”), aff’d, 
765 F. App’x 855 (3d Cir. 2019).  That concession is not 
without a legal basis.  Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989), new substantive rules apply retroactively in cases on 
collateral review.  See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 181.  A “rule is 
substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of 
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”  Schriro 
v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).  “This includes 
decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by 
interpreting its terms . . . .”  Id. at 351–52.  And “a case 
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”  
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.  A “holding is not so dictated . . . 
unless it would have been ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists.’”  
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347 (2013) (quoting 
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997)).  
McDonnell arguably satisfies these requirements. 
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an evidentiary hearing, at which the petitioner may introduce 
new evidence and the Government may present additional 
evidence to refute the petitioner’s claim.  Id. at 253.  Or the 
petitioner may rest on the record as it stands.  Id.  
  
While the “Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a 
prisoner can obtain habeas relief based on a freestanding claim 
of actual innocence, . . . ‘the threshold showing for such an 
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.’”  
Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 417 (1993)).  Our Court’s precedents instruct “that actual 
innocence claims under § 2241 are to be initially tested against 
the . . . actual innocence gateway standard” by which a habeas 
petitioner may overcome a procedural default even without 
cause and prejudice.  Id. at 184 (employing the standard set 
forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314–15 (1995)); see also 
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (noting that a 
freestanding actual-innocence claim would require “more 
convincing proof of innocence” than does the gateway 
standard).  When actual innocence relies on an intervening 
interpretation of substantive criminal law, the actual-innocence 
gateway standard requires a petitioner to show that, in light of 
all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable 
juror properly instructed on the intervening interpretation 
would have convicted him.  See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 184; see 
also Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246.  We have observed that the 
“[f]ailure to meet the gateway standard is sufficient to reject 
any hypothetical freestanding actual innocence claim.”  Bruce, 
868 F.3d at 184.   
 
The District Court held that Cordaro failed to satisfy the 
actual-innocence gateway standard.  It reasoned that Cordaro 
did not show that it was more likely than not that no reasonable 
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juror properly instructed on the meaning of “official act” under 
McDonnell would have voted to convict him.  Thus, it denied 
his petition. 
 
We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s final 
order denying Cordaro’s petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253(a).  Since the District Court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing, our review is plenary.  Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
  In McDonnell, the Supreme Court vacated the 
convictions of former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell 
for allegedly accepting bribes from a nutritional-supplement 
company to commit certain “official acts”:  arranging 
meetings, hosting events, contacting other government 
officials, promoting the company’s product and facilitating its 
relationship with government officials, and recommending that 
senior government officials meet with its executives.  136 S. 
Ct. at 2365–66.  The Court held that “setting up a meeting, 
calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, 
standing alone, qualify as an ‘official act.’”  Id. at 2368.  
Instead, an “official act” has two statutory requirements.  First, 
there must be a “matter” — that is, “a ‘question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may at any time be 
pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official” 
— and second, “the public official must make a decision or 
take an action on that question or matter, or agree to do so.”  
Id. at 2368, 2370. 
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We consider whether it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted Cordaro of bribery, 
extortion, and racketeering if properly instructed on this 
definition.4  The answer is no.   
                                              
4 Neither party questions whether the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 201’s definition of “official acts” 
in McDonnell applies to Cordaro’s Hobbs Act extortion and 
racketeering convictions.  Instead “they each apply the ‘official 
act’ definition from McDonnell in support of their arguments 
on appeal,” and neither side “argues for an alternative 
definition.”  United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 116 n.67 (2d 
Cir. 2017).  We therefore assume that the interpretation in 
McDonnell applies, even though the Court was interpreting a 
different statute than the one that Cordaro was convicted of 
violating and, unlike in that case, there is no evidence here that 
the parties agreed at trial to rely on 18 U.S.C. § 201’s 
definition. 
The parties do disagree whether McDonnell applies to 
Cordaro’s conviction for bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666.  As relevant here, § 666 criminalizes agreeing to accept 
anything of value “intending to be influenced or rewarded in 
connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, or agency.”  Id. 
§ 666(a)(1)(B).  The trial court instructed the jury, however, 
that this crime requires “the intent to be influenced or rewarded 
in connection with official actions.”  J.A. 979.  Because the 
court said “official actions,” Cordaro argues that McDonnell 
applies.  The Government responds that, if anything, the 
instruction narrowed § 666 and points out that the Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits have held that 
McDonnell does not apply to § 666.  Since we conclude that 
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First, there is evidence of a “matter”:  contracts with 
Lackawanna County.  Both Acker Associates and Highland 
Associates were repeat county contractors.  Acker Associates 
had contracts to work on the Lackawanna Watershed 2000 
Program, the Main Street Bridge in Taylor, the Gilmartin Street 
Bridge in Archbald, and more.  Highland Associates had 
contracts to work on the courthouse, the public safety center, 
the intermodal center, and the stadium.  
  
Entering into contracts is “a formal exercise of 
governmental power” that falls “within the specific duties of 
an official’s position.”  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369.  
Contracts are negotiated, performed, and concluded or 
terminated.  It is easy to imagine any of those steps being “put 
on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as 
complete.”  Id.  And they are “focused and concrete” — 
Lackawanna County does not contract for something 
amorphous like “[e]conomic development,” for example, id., 
but for specific projects or services, such as “building a 
wastewater treatment plant for acid mine drainage,” J.A. 521 
(McLaine).  Contracts are therefore like a lawsuit or 
administrative proceeding and unlike “a typical meeting, 
telephone call, or event arranged by a public official.”  
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368.  Indeed, as we have explained, 
“[t]he awarding of a [government] contract is not only akin to 
an agency determination — it is an agency determination.”  
United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 253 (3d Cir. 2017).  It is 
                                              
Cordaro fails to prove his actual innocence even under 
McDonnell’s definition of “official acts,” we need not resolve 
whether McDonnell in fact applies to § 666. 
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probable that some reasonable juror would conclude that the 
county contracts constituted “matters” under McDonnell. 
 
Second, it is probable that some reasonable juror would 
conclude that Cordaro agreed to or did act on those matters.   
 
Considering first Acker Associates, there is evidence 
that Cordaro acted on its contracts directly.  When McLaine 
was worried about losing the Taylor Bridge contract, he met 
with Cordaro, who told him that he could keep the full contract 
and to call the other engineers and tell them so.  McLaine did 
and kept the contract.5 
 
This is also evidence that Cordaro agreed to act on 
Acker Associates’ contracts.  At their first meeting, Cordaro 
told McLaine that he would “let [Acker Associates] keep that 
[existing work],” but “if we’re having fundraisers you’re going 
to have to participate and support us.”  J.A. 526 (McLaine).  
And when McLaine was worried about losing the watershed-
project contract, Cordaro asked Hughes whether McLaine 
would pay “to keep his work.”  J.A. 621 (Hughes).  Hughes 
then told McLaine that Acker Associates could keep all of its 
existing work if McLaine gave Hughes $10,000 a month for 
Cordaro.  The Court in McDonnell emphasized that “a public 
official is not required to actually make a decision or take an 
action” on the matter; “it is enough that the official agree to do 
so.”  136 S. Ct. at 2370–71.  “The agreement need not be 
explicit, and the public official need not specify the means that 
he will use to perform his end of the bargain.  Nor must the 
public official in fact intend to perform the ‘official act,’ so 
                                              
5 And McLaine paid Cordaro extra at least once because he 
“had gotten another . . . contract[].”  J.A. 626 (Hughes). 
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long as he agrees to do so.”  Id. at 2371.  It is probable that 
some reasonable juror would conclude from this evidence that 
Cordaro made such an agreement. 
 
For Highland Associates, the evidence too shows direct 
action.  Cordaro was prominent in the negotiation of Highland 
Associates’ contract with COLTS after he told COLTS 
chairman James Finan to ask the other architects working on 
the intermodal center to step aside so COLTS could go forward 
with just Highland Associates.  It is probable that some 
reasonable juror would conclude from this evidence that 
Cordaro “was attempting to pressure or advise another official 
on a pending matter.”  Id.  Both actions qualify under 
McDonnell, as does “a decision or action on a qualifying step.”  
Id. at 2370. 
 
There are also the payments themselves:  monthly 
$10,000 payments from Acker Associates and three $30,000 
payments from Highland Associates (nearly half a million 
dollars in total).  The Court explained in McDonnell that a jury 
could “conclude that an agreement was reached if the evidence 
shows that the public official received a thing of value knowing 
that it was given with the expectation that the official would 
perform an ‘official act’ in return.”  Id. at 2371.  It is probable 
that some reasonable juror would conclude that had occurred 
here. 
     
Taking this evidence together, would some reasonable 
juror conclude that Cordaro committed official acts as defined 
by McDonnell?  The answer is yes.  And Cordaro must show 
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
reach that conclusion.  He fails to do so and thus fails to prove 
his actual innocence.   
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B. 
 
Cordaro challenges this conclusion in three ways.  First, 
he points out that the engineering firms actually contracted 
with independent governmental agencies, not the county itself.  
Second, he identifies new evidence impeaching key 
Government witnesses.  And third, he highlights trial evidence 
of routine meetings that do not constitute official acts.  None 
of these facts change our conclusion.  
 
1. 
 
First, Cordaro argues that the governmental agencies 
that contracted with Acker Associates and Highland Associates 
are independent legal authorities distinct from Lackawanna 
County itself.   
 
This fact does not affect whether the contracts are a 
“matter” under McDonnell.  In McDonnell itself, the primary 
“matter” was whether researchers at Virginia’s state 
universities would study a nutritional supplement.  See 136 S. 
Ct. at 2369–70.  State universities are independent legal 
authorities, and McDonnell had “limited decision-making 
power in this area.”  136 S. Ct. at 2363.  None of that mattered 
to the Supreme Court.  On the contrary, the Court specifically 
explained that it “would be illegal” to agree to “pressure or 
advise another official on a pending matter . . . in exchange for 
a thing of value.”  Id. at 2371. 
 
Nor does this fact affect whether Cordaro made a 
decision or took an action on those contracts or “agree[d] to do 
so.”  Id.  Maybe Cordaro did not mean it when he said that he 
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would “let [Acker Associates] keep that [existing work]” 
because he lacked the authority to do so.  J.A. 526 (McLaine).  
But under McDonnell that does not matter, “so long as he 
agrees to do so.”  136 S. Ct. at 2371.   
 
There is also evidence that in fact Cordaro was able and 
intended to influence whether Acker Associates and Highland 
Associates retained their contracts.  Cordaro himself said that 
he could:  he told McLaine as much at their first meeting.  And 
the principals of these firms — experienced county contractors 
— certainly thought he could.  McLaine was worried about 
Acker Associates’ work right after the election, and both firms 
paid Cordaro tens of thousands of dollars.  That Cordaro 
solicited those payments (through Hughes and Munchak) and 
accepted them (through Hughes and Munchak and on his own) 
suggests that he could and intended to exert some influence in 
return.  See, e.g., Repak, 852 F.3d at 254 (“[The defendant’s] 
continued receipt of items from those contractors further 
demonstrated that he intended for such items . . . to influence 
the award of [government] contracts to those contractors.”).   
There is even evidence that Cordaro did influence 
contracts with county agencies.  Cordaro influenced the Taylor 
Bridge contract, keeping the design work with Acker 
Associates, and he influenced the COLTS contract, having 
another architectural firm’s existing contract terminated — 
precisely the risk that Acker Associates and Highland 
Associates paid dearly to avoid.   
 
In sum, whatever the chain of technical legal authority 
in Lackawanna County, there is ample evidence that Cordaro 
agreed to, could, and did influence who kept and lost contracts 
with county entities.  Again, it is probable — and indeed quite 
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likely — that some reasonable juror would conclude that 
Cordaro agreed to exert that influence for cash. 
 
In that regard, this case is much like United States v. 
Repak.  Repak was the executive director of a municipal 
agency governed by a board of directors.  852 F.3d at 237.  Like 
Cordaro, Repak himself did not authorize the contracts at issue; 
the board of directors did.  Id.  Repak, however, made 
recommendations and played “a vital role in the process of 
selecting” contractors.  Id.  Challenging his bribery and 
extortion convictions on direct appeal, Repak argued that “the 
facilitation of the award of those contracts is not a decision or 
action ‘on’ a question or matter” under McDonnell.  Id. at 254.  
We rejected that argument.  On the contrary, we explained, the 
record proved that “Repak had the power to, and indeed did, 
make recommendations . . . as to the contractors [that the 
agency] hired for projects.”  Id.  This “evidence was sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that he accepted the [gifts] knowing 
that he was to use his power, i.e., the ability to provide advice, 
to influence the [agency’s] awarding of contracts.”  Id.  
Similarly here, the record shows that Cordaro had the power 
to, and indeed did, influence contracts with county agencies.  
Based on this evidence, it is probable that some reasonable 
juror would conclude that Cordaro committed official acts. 
 
Our Repak decision also belies the argument that there 
was no matter “pending” for Cordaro to influence because the 
contracts already existed.  Repak solicited items from 
contractors who already had municipal contracts, and those 
contractors acquiesced in Repak’s solicitations because they 
felt that they would lose work if they did not.  Id. at 237.  
Cordaro engaged in the same conduct.   
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Cordaro argues that Repak actually favors him because, 
unlike the defendant there, he “was not the executive in charge 
of the contract-awarding entity.”  Cordaro Br. 30.  We are not 
persuaded.  Contrary to Cordaro’s arguments, Repak was not 
“in charge,” nor did he have “the ability to award contracts.”  
Id.  Rather, it was the board of directors that “ultimately 
confer[red] contracts.”  Repak, 852 F.3d at 237.  The only 
distinction between Repak and Cordaro, then, is that Repak 
worked inside the contracting governmental agency, while 
Cordaro did not.  Nothing in our Repak opinion suggests that 
makes a difference.  Cordaro, like Repak, still had the “power 
. . . to influence the [agency’s] awarding of contracts” because 
of his position.  Id. at 254.  Even if Cordaro’s official role was 
more removed from the decisionmaking, unlike Repak he was 
superior to the decisionmakers — as county commissioner, he 
appointed the board members, including both board members 
who approved Highland Associates’ COLTS contract.   
 
Thus, this argument does not disturb our conclusion that 
it is probable that some reasonable juror would vote to convict 
Cordaro under McDonnell. 
2. 
 
Second, Cordaro argues that new impeachment 
evidence discredits Hughes and McLaine.  After trial, both men 
were indicted for fraud, and McLaine was convicted.  The 
parties disagree whether we can consider this evidence, but 
their disagreement is immaterial since this evidence does not 
disturb our conclusion.  To begin, this evidence hardly bears 
on the issues raised by McDonnell.  A jury properly or 
improperly instructed on “official acts” would assess the 
credibility of Hughes and McLaine just the same.   
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But regardless, this new impeachment evidence seems 
unlikely to matter to a reasonable juror’s vote.  It was clear at 
trial that McLaine and Hughes were corrupt.  McLaine bribed 
Cordaro, Hughes helped, and then McLaine labeled Hughes a 
“consultant” in the books and covered his tax liability out of 
pocket.  The trial jury still found them credible enough to 
convict Cordaro.  Would no properly instructed and reasonable 
juror reach that conclusion knowing McLaine and Hughes 
were later indicted (and McLaine convicted) for other fraud 
offenses?  That does not seem more likely than not — in fact it 
does not seem likely at all.  So we do not find this argument 
persuasive. 
 
3. 
 
Third, Cordaro argues that the erroneous jury 
instructions allowed the jury to convict him for routine 
meetings with Acker Associates and Highland Associates that 
were noncriminal under McDonnell.  If this were a direct 
appeal of erroneous (and contemporaneously objected to) jury 
instructions, we would ask whether it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury properly instructed would 
have found Cordaro guilty.  See, e.g., United States v. Fattah, 
914 F.3d 112, 155 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Silver, 864 
F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2017).  And if we concluded that “the 
jury may have convicted [Cordaro] for conduct that is not 
unlawful,” we would be unable to “conclude that the error in 
the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
and we would “vacate and remand the convictions.”  Fattah, 
914 F.3d at 155. 
 
But this is not a direct appeal.  We are not presented 
with whether the jury may have convicted Cordaro for conduct 
26 
 
noncriminal under McDonnell.  We are not concerned with 
what the misinformed jury did, might have done, or could have 
done.  Instead, we are making a “probabilistic determination 
about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.”  
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.  And, making that determination, we 
cannot conclude that “no juror, acting reasonably, would have 
voted to find [Cordaro] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.   
IV. 
 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
